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Abstract: 
Despite widespread evidence that fictional models play an explanatory role in science, 
resistance remains to the idea that fictions can explain.  A central source of this resistance 
is a particular view about what explanations are, namely, the ontic conception of 
explanation.  According to the ontic conception, explanations just are the concrete entities 
in the world.  I argue this conception is ultimately incoherent and that even a weaker 
version of the ontic conception fails.  Fictional models can succeed in offering genuine 
explanations by correctly capturing relevant patterns of counterfactual dependence and 
licensing correct inferences.  Using the example of Newtonian force explanations of the 
tides, I show how, even in science, fiction can be a vehicle for truth.   
 
 
I. Fiction As a Vehicle for Truth 
 The idea that fiction can be an effective vehicle for truth has long been recognized 
in both literature and the arts.  This expression can be traced back to an 1833 treatise by 
Jacob Abbott (1803-1879), who was a minister, children's book author, and professor of 
mathematics and natural philosophy at Amherst College.  In this treatise, Abbott argues 
that fictional stories are not only an effective vehicle for communicating the truths of 
morality, but that they do so far more effectively than true accounts of moral acts.  He 
writes, 
No ingenuity can transform the story of the Good Samaritan, or of the 
Interpreter's House, into historical records of matters of fact.  All that we can say 
of them is, that the truth shines out so clearly, and predominates so decidedly, that 
we hardly consider them fiction; which is no more nor less than saying, that the 
work is skillful done; the object of making fiction the vehicle of truth, is 
successfully and safely accomplished. (Abbott 1833, p. 32) 
 
Abbott is not alone in recognizing this role for fictions.  In the context of art, Pablo 
Picasso, for example, writes "Art is a lie that makes us realize truth, at least the truth that 
is given us to understand" (Picasso 1923, p. 315).  Similarly the Quaker author Jessamyn 
West writes, "Fiction reveals truths that reality obscures" (West 1957, p. 39).  Common 
                                                
† I would like to express my gratitude to Fiora Salis, Juha Saatsi, and to the audience 
members at both the "Scientific Fictionalism" conference in London and the 
"Idealizations, Fictions, and Values in Science" workshop at Dartmouth for feedback on 
this paper.   
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to these quotations is the idea that fictions can be an effective means by which we can 
come to understand truths that would otherwise be difficult to grasp.   
 While we may be willing to grant that fiction can be a vehicle for truth in the 
context of literature and art, most people are far less comfortable with the idea that fiction 
could be in the service of truth when it comes to science.  Science, it is commonly 
thought, must deal only in the truth, the whole truth (if possible), and nothing but the 
truth.  After all, isn't fiction ultimately antithetical to truth?  Won't scientists be misled 
into a labyrinth of confusion and be lulled by the mere illusion of understanding if they 
trade in fictions?   
 Even those who have granted a limited function for fictions in science have 
denied that they can play a role in scientific explanation or in generating genuine 
knowledge.  Hans Vahinger (1852-1933), for example, in his Philosophy of 'As If' 
identifies the following four key characteristics of scientific fictions: 1. Fictions deviate 
from reality; 2. Fictions are ultimately to be eliminated; 3. There must be an express 
awareness that the fiction is just a fiction; and 4.  “Where there is no expediency the 
fiction is unscientific” (Vaihinger ([1911] 1952, p. 99).1  Vaihinger emphatically denied, 
however, that explanation and understanding were among the goals of science for which 
fictions could be expedient.  He writes, “Every fiction has, strictly speaking, only a 
practical object in science, for it does not create real knowledge” (Vaihinger [1911] 1952, 
p. 88); and further “The hypothesis results in real explanation, the fiction induces only an 
illusion of understanding” (Vaihinger [1911] 1952, p. xv).  Elsewhere  I have discussed 
Vaihinger's views in more depth, and defended the view that, pace Vaihinger, fictions do 
have a role to play in scientific explanation and in advancing genuine understanding 
(Bokulich 2009).  Moreover, I have developed a model-based account of scientific 
explanation according to which fictions can explain (Bokulich 2008a,b, 2011, 2012).  
Lingering doubts have remained, however. 
 In what follows I want to diagnose (and ultimately excise) what I believe is a 
central source of the remaining resistance to the idea that fictions can advance scientific 
understanding and play a legitimate role in explanation: the ontic conception of 
explanation.  Before critically engaging the ontic view, however, there are a few 
preliminaries that are important to articulate for a proper framing of my project.  First, 
my account of explanatory fictions lies within a broadly realist approach to science.  
Second, I view both explanation and understanding as success terms: explanation requires 
gaining genuine insight into the way the world is, and understanding is not just an “Aha!” 
feeling.  Third, I take it that scientists do actually succeed in giving genuine scientific 
explanations (not would give genuine explanations in some final, future physics) and that 
those genuine explanations occur across all the sciences (i.e., even the 'special' sciences).  
Finally, I endorse explanatory pluralism, according to which there can be more than one 
                                                
1 In Bokulich 2009 I argued that we should accept all of Vaihinger's conditions for 
scientific fictions except for condition #2, that fictions should be eliminated; science may 
choose to keep some fictions (e.g., the fiction of light rays) permanently "on the books" 
because of their great utility and fertility (p. 93). 
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scientific explanation for a given phenomenon (some of which might be deeper2 than 
others, etc.).3   
 
 
II. Who's Afraid of Fictions in Science? 
 The use of fictions is widespread across the sciences, as has been well-
documented in several recent anthologies (e.g., Suárez 2009; Woods 2010).  Moreover, in 
many cases, these fictions seem to play an explanatory role (e.g., Batterman 2009; 
Bokulich 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2012; Weiskopf 2011).  This use of fictional posits in 
scientific explanation runs counter to the received view of scientific explanation, 
according to which only true accounts and existing entities, processes, etc. can explain.  
Michael Strevens, for example, writes, “No causal account of explanation--certainly not 
the kairetic account—allows nonveridical models to explain” (Strevens 2008, p. 297).  
The difficulty, however, is that an examination of scientific practice reveals that models 
routinely play a central role in scientific explanation and that all models are nonveridical 
to some degree.  Recognizing these incontrovertible points, those who deny that fictions 
can explain then try to sort model elements into the true and the false, and only the 
former are claimed to do any real explanatory work: 
The content of an idealized model, then, can be divided into two parts.  The first 
part contains the difference-makers for the explanatory target. . . . The second part 
is all idealization; its overt claims are false but its role is to point to parts of the 
actual world that do not make a difference to the explanatory target (Strevens 
2008, p. 318). 
 
Whether such a clean decomposition and quarantining of the fictional and idealized 
elements is possible is ultimately an empirical question answerable to scientific practice.  
Elsewhere I have raised some doubts about whether such a quarantining is possible (e.g., 
Bokulich 2008b, 2009, 2012).  My aim here, however, is to critically engage the 
underlying assumption about the nature of explanation that implicitly or explicitly drives 
these intuitions that fictions cannot explain.  That assumption is the ontic conception of 
explanation. 
 The ontic conception of explanation was first articulated by José Alberto Coffa 
and further elaborated by Wesley Salmon.  In Four Decades, Salmon recalls, 
Coffa is a staunch defender of the ontic conception of scientific explanation. . . . 
For Coffa, what explains an event is whatever produced it or brought it about. . . . 
Explanations, in his view, are fully objective and . . . exist whether or not anyone 
                                                
2 For a discussion of explanatory depth, see Hitchcock and Woodward (2003). 
3 The expression explanatory pluralism has been used to describe two different views in 
the philosophy of science: on the one hand it has been used to describe the fact that 
scientists use different kinds of explanations in different fields at different times (e.g., 
deductive-nomological, causal-mechanical, structural, etc.).  On the other hand, more 
recently the expression has also been used to mean that multiple, scientifically acceptable 
explanations can be offered for a particular, given phenomenon (the sense being used 
here).  Elsewhere I have referred to these as "Type I" and "Type II" explanatory 
pluralism, respectively (Bokulich (in progress)). 
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ever discovers or describes them.  Explanations are not epistemically relativized, 
nor . . . do they have psychological components, nor do they have pragmatic 
dimensions. (Salmon 1989, p. 133)   
 
Salmon endorses the ontic conception of explanation, but wavers between two ways of 
thinking about it: 
Proponents of this [ontic] conception can speak in either of two ways about the 
relationship between explanations and the world.  First one can say that 
explanations exist in the world.  The explanation of some fact is whatever 
produced it or brought it about. . . . Second, the advocate of the ontic 
interpretation can say that an explanation is something . . . that  reports such facts.  
It seems to me that either way of putting the ontic conception is acceptable. 
(Salmon 1989, p. 86) 
 
In much of Salmon's writing and the subsequent philosophical literature, the former 
reading of the ontic conception has predominated.  Salmon contrasts the ontic conception 
with what he calls the modal conception and the epistemic conception (though his 
articulation of these contrasts is, I believe, a bit confused and will not be further 
discussed here).  It is important to distinguish a "conception of explanation", which is a 
view about what explanations are, from an "account of explanation", which is a view 
about how explanations work.  For example, Salmon endorses both the ontic conception 
of explanation and the causal account of explanation.  One can, however, reject the ontic 
conception of explanation (i.e., deny that explanations are things in the world, 
independent of human theorizing), but endorse the view that many explanations are 
indeed causal (i.e., involve citing and representing the relevant subset of causes of the 
phenomenon).   
 More recently, the ontic conception of explanation has been explicitly endorsed in 
several prominent accounts of scientific explanation.  Carl Craver, for example, writes, 
Salmon’s most penetrating insight was to abandon the idea . . . that explanations 
are arguments.  Instead, he defended an ontic view, according to which 
explanations are objective features of the world. . . . explanation refers to an 
objective portion of the causal structure of the world. . . .  Objective explanations, 
the causes and mechanisms in the world, are the correct starting point. (Craver 
2007, p. 27)  
 
In this quotation we see Craver explicitly embracing the ontic view and arguing that 
explanations are the causes and mechanisms in the world themselves.  Strevens similarly 
endorses the ontic conception writing,  
Philosophers sometimes talk as if an explanation were something out in the world, 
a set of facts to be discovered, and sometimes as if it were a communicative 
act . . . I follow the lead of most philosophers of explanation, and of most 
proponents of the causal approach in particular, in giving the first, ontological 
sense of explanation precedence.. . . from this point forward, I use explanation 
exclusively in the first, ontological sense. (Strevens 2008, pp. 6-7) 
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Both of these quotations articulate the core claim of the ontic conception, namely that 
explanations are the full-bodied objects in the world that push, pull, or cause things to 
happen: explanations just are (in the sense of 'are identical to') the particular rock, the 
particular collection of testosterone molecules, the Sagittarius A* black hole.  Indeed it 
would seem every single thing in the universe (known or unknown) should be classified 
as an explanation on this view, since there is some phenomenon, no matter how trivial, 
for which it is causally (or otherwise) responsible.  The claim is not just that these things 
are causes or causally relevant, but that they are further scientific explanations.  Scientists 
and scientific theorizing are not actually needed for there to be scientific explanations; 
explanation is not a human activity on the ontic view.   
 Although they are logically independent of one another, historically, the ontic 
conception and the causal account of explanation have gone hand in hand.  The rise of the 
causal account as the new orthodoxy in explanation, has hence brought with it a wide-
spread endorsement of the ontic conception, though often in ways that are often not fully 
acknowledged or analyzed.4  If one takes explanations to be the concrete entities in the 
world, then it certainly doesn't look like fictions could explain: a fiction does not actually 
exist, hence it does not belong to the class of worldly entities that could be counted as 
explanations.  As we saw above, Strevens's commitment to the ontic conception leads 
him to deny that false models can explain.  Similarly Craver writes, "If we say, in 
contrast, that false models explain, we are left scratching our heads about how a false 
model could be an explanation of anything at all" (Craver 2014, p. 50).  If one assumes 
the ontic conception of explanation, then the prima facie explanatory power of fictions in 
science is indeed puzzling.  But is the ontic conception correct?  What was the original 
motivation for the ontic view?  What are the alternatives to the ontic conception of 
explanation? Is the ontic conception really the most plausible of the views?  Until very 
recently these questions have been drastically undertheorized.   
 
 
III. The Retreat from the Ontic View 
 Recently the ontic view has come under fire from several directions.  One of the 
earliest and most vocal critics of the ontic view is Cory Wright.5  There are three 
components to Wright's (2012) criticism: first, he disentangles the mechanistic account of 
explanation from the ontic conception, arguing that one can adopt the former while 
rejecting the latter.  Second he raises criticisms against the ontic reading of mechanistic 
explanation (largely via a linguistic analysis of how we use the word 'explanation').  And 
third, he defends (briefly) an epistemic reading of mechanistic explanation instead. 
Wright begins by noting that the ontic conception isn't the only way to think about 
                                                
4 James Woodward, for example, allies himself with the ontic conception, writing "The 
theory I am proposing is thus what Salmon (1984) calls a realist or 'ontic' theory of 
explanation (Woodward 2003, p. 202), though it is, on a strict reading, incompatible with 
his view (which I endorse here) that successful explanation does not require getting the 
fundamental ontology right (Woodward 2003,p. 223).   
5 Bechtel and Abrahamson (2005) cite Wright as being influential in leading them to 
adopt a non-ontic conception of mechanistic explanation.   
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mechanistic explanation.  William Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen, for example, view 
explanation as a cognitive activity, rather than as the objects/mechanisms in the world: 
 
[E]xplanation is a cognitive activity that involves representing and reasoning 
about nature. . . . linguistic representations are not privileged and often diagrams 
provide a better vehicle for representing mechanisms.  (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 
2005, p. 439) 
 
Wright himself views explanation as a class of complex representations (Wright 2012, p. 
376).  This work makes clear that the ontic conception is not the only possible conception 
of scientific explanation, so we need to critically examine whether it is in fact the most 
plausible conception.   
 Wright's central critique is that the ontic conception of explanation does not 
respect our linguistic practices.  He asks us to consider, for example, the following two 
sentences: 
a.) The repeated exposure to loud noises caused Strummer’s hearing loss. 
b.) The repeated exposure to loud noises explains Strummer’s hearing loss. 
 
Wright notes, “the two sentences. . . do not ‘say the same thing’. . . . the first involves. . .a 
temporally bounded event prior to the time of utterance, the second involves an atemporal 
and unbounded event that has held up to the time of utterance and beyond (Wright 2012, 
p. 390).  He concludes that it is a mistake to identify explanations with the causes 
themselves.  More generally, Wright argues that when we say that a mechanism explains, 
we are really just anthropomorphizing and speaking metaphorically: vibrations cause, 
people explain.   
 What about Salmon's alternative reading of the ontic conception?  In many places 
in Salmon's writings he articulates the ontic conception as an 'exhibiting' of the relevant 
entities and processes involved in the explanation:   
According to the ontic conception--as I see it, at least--an explanation of an event  
involves exhibiting that event as it is embedded in its causal network and/or 
displaying its internal causal structure. (Salmon 1984a, p. 298) 
 
It is not entirely clear, however, what precisely Salmon means by 'exhibiting' or 
'displaying.'  Wright (2015) takes up the task of exploring the different possible ways one 
could construe the notion of exhibiting.  He notes that while 'exhibiting' finds a natural 
interpretation on the epistemic conception of explanation (e.g., as either a representation 
or communicative act), it remains fundamentally obscure on the ontic conception.  He 
argues that there is no way to unpack this term such that it is consistent with the 
fundamental thesis of the ontic conception: namely, that explanation denotes non-
representational, mind-independent entities in the world.   
 In light of the inability to find a sense of 'exhibition' that is consistent with the 
fundamental tenets of the ontic conception, an alternative construal is that the notion of 
exhibition is not in fact a substantive part of Salmon's ontic conception after all, but is 
rather what Wright calls an empty "filler" term.  It is this latter interpretation that seems 
to be adopted by the new ontic theorists.  As Wright argues, however, the tendency to use 
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words like 'exhibit' or 'display', but leave them unanalyzed is why the ontic conception 
has enjoyed what he believes is, an unwarranted success: 
For instance, Craver claims that exhibition should be deemphasized in Salmon's 
version of OC [the ontic conception]. . . . But the real problem is that filler terms 
like exhibition belie a deeply representational (epistemic, cognitive, etc.) approach 
to explanation, and so contravene the very conceptions of ontic explanation. . . . 
Indeed, neglect of the conceptual problems underlying Salmon's widespread use 
of exhibition is just what has misled some philosophers to injudiciously take up 
the ontic conception in the first place. (Wright 2015, p. 20) 
 
As we will see, similar criticisms can be raised against Craver's invocation of normative 
constraints on explanation, which are similarly inconsistent with a thorough-going ontic 
conception.   
 In a recent paper Craver has reaffirmed his commitment to the ontic conception of 
explanation: 
Conceived ontically . . . the term explanation refers to an objective portion of the 
causal structure of the world, to the set of factors that produce, underlie, or are 
otherwise responsible for a phenomenon.  Ontic explanations are not texts; they 
are full-bodied things.  They are not true or false.  They are not more or less 
abstract.  They are not more or less complete.  They consist in all and only the 
relevant features of the mechanisms in question.  There is no question of ontic 
explanations being "right" or "wrong," or "good" or "bad."  They just are. (Craver 
2014, p. 40) 
 
This is a nice clear statement of what the ontic conception of explanation is.  Although 
Craver thinks this is the most important and fundamental notion of explanation, he admits 
that the term explanation is ambiguous, insofar as it is sometimes also used to refer to a 
communication, other times to refer to a text, and finally sometimes also used to refer to a 
cognitive activity.  Craver wants, however, to place these other senses of explanation 
"down stream," and assert the primacy of the ontic conception.   
 Although Craver recognizes these other senses of explanation, he does not always 
do enough to distinguish which sense of explanation he is employing at various points in 
his discussion.  For example, Craver frames this paper as a discussion about what a good 
theory of explanation should accomplish.  He writes that there are two goals:  
The first is explanatory demarcation: the theory should distinguish explanation 
from other forms of scientific achievement.  Explanation is one among many 
kinds of scientific success; others include control, description, measurement, and 
taxonomy. . . . The second goal is explanatory normativity.  The theory should 
illuminate the criteria that distinguish good explanations from bad. (Craver 2014, 
p. 28). 
 
While all this sounds plausible, if we substitute 'explanationontic' in for the occurrences of 
'explanation' in the above quotation it becomes incoherent.  Explanation cannot be a form 
of scientific achievement or success if it denotes non-representational, mind-independent 
entities in the world.  A rock or a flux of sodium and potassium ions is not a scientific 
achievement alongside prediction, measurement, and taxonomy, the latter of which are all 
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human endeavors.  Similarly, normative constraints are completely out of place on the 
ontic reading of explanation: one cannot distinguish good explanationsontic from bad; as 
Craver himself says in this same article (and as quoted above), they just are.   
 This seems to be a common problem for the ontic theorists: they find it difficult to 
talk consistently about explanation in the way we all naturally would, while remaining 
true to the ontic conception.  The plausibility of the ontic conception then becomes 
artificially inflated by subtly equivocating between the ontic and epistemic conceptions 
of explanation.  Phyllis Illari proposes to rescue the ontic theorists from this doublespeak 
by shifting the debate from a discussion of what explanations are to a discussion of 
constraints on explanations.  She writes, 
[A]lthough they also sometimes appear to be arguing about what mechanistic 
explanations themselves are. . . . they are moving towards a focus on 
constraints. . . . I will frame the debate in these terms of normative constraints on 
explanation. . . . Within this new frame, I will argue that good mechanistic 
explanations must satisfy both ontic and epistemic constraints. (Illari 2013, p. 
241)6 
 
Although Illari diplomatically paints this as a win-win synthesis of Craver's ontic 
mechanistic explanation and Bechtel's epistemic mechanistic explanation, it is strictly 
speaking a rejection of the ontic conception as Craver defined it (e.g., Craver 2014, p. 
40).  The move to normative constraints (whether ontic or epistemic) requires admitting 
something like a representational view of explanation.7   
 In the move from a discussion of what explanations are, to what constraints 
explanations must satisfy (what Benjamin Sheredos (2016) describes as a semantic ascent 
and normative turn), Craver's next strategy is to argue for the primacy of ontic constraints 
over all others.  He writes, "Representations convey explanatory information about a 
phenomenon when and only when they describe the ontic explanations for those 
phenomena" (Craver 2014, p. 28; emphasis added).  Explanationtexts then are to be judged 
as explanatory only to the extent that they faithfully describe the actual mechanisms in 
the world.8  In the context of explanatory models (presumably a kind of representation or 
explanationtext) David Kaplan and Craver (2011) describe this as the "3M" (model-to-
mechanism-mapping) requirement.   
 Although this marks a shift away from the original ontic view towards the 
representational view of explanation, it is one that still clearly denies that fictional 
representations can be explanatory.  Craver does, however, admit the incontrovertible 
point that models contain idealizations and other falsehoods, and so allows that the 3M 
                                                
6 Although Illari's (2013) paper was published before Craver's (2014), she is quoting and 
responding to an advanced copy or draft of Craver (2014), which had already been 
accepted for publication and is cited there as "Craver (2012)".   
7 Illari puts the point optimistically: "As Craver is now explicit in accepting the move to 
considering normative constraints on good explanation, I think he is bound to accept that 
some of the regulative ideals governing what makes a good mechanistic explanation 
include representational aspects" (Illari 2013, p. 251).  
8 Here I am using explanationtext to stand in for any broadly representational view, 
including models, diagrams, etc.  
 9 
mapping requirement can be selective.  Presumably, however, those idealizations and 
falsehoods cannot be in the "difference makers", as Strevens (2008, p. 318) would say, 
otherwise they would lose their explanatory status.  Craver tries to sidestep the problem 
of idealization entirely by declaring it outside the scope of theories of explanation: 
"Terms like . . . 'idealized' . . . apply to representations. . . . [t]hey do not apply to the 
ontic structures. . . . Once these are separated, the problem of idealization is clearly not a 
problem for philosophical theories of explanation" (Craver 2014, p. 50).  Bracketing for 
the moment questions about the merits of this claim, such a move is simply no longer 
available once one has made the semantic ascent and taken the normative turn.  The 
problem of how the idealized explanationstexts that scientists routinely offer can count as 
genuinely explanatory needs to be confronted. 
 Is this new, more circumscribed ground that the ontic conception has staked out, 
namely that ontic constraints have priority and that a faithful mapping of explanationstext 
to explanationsontic is required in order to count as explanatory, ultimately defensible? 
Benjamin Sheredos (2016) has argued that it is not.  He writes, 
If we take the normative turn, the true task for the ontic theorist who promotes 
EEM [Explanationtext–to–Explanationontic-Mapping] is to make good on its 
conjecture of the normative priority of ontic norms, showing that, whatever we 
mean by "explanation[text]," its full success must constitutively involve 
"mappability" to explanationsontic.  (Sheredos 2016, p. [23]) 
 
He points out, however, that traditionally two central epistemic norms of explanationtext 
are generality and systematicity.  By 'generality' he means the invocation of categorical 
claims regarding classes of explananda and explanantia, and by 'systematicity' he means 
the specification of some principle of extrapolation that allows an explanation to be 
applied to multiple cases (Sheredos 2016, p.[4]).  These norms are brought to the fore by 
unificationist accounts of explanation, for example, but govern scientific theorizing much 
more broadly.  Sheredos concludes, 
[A] general and systematic explanation[text] has a distinct logical and explanatory 
import compared to that of a singular explanation[text] which 'maps' to a token 
concrete explanationontic.  If EEM is still to be maintained as true, then there must 
be something distinctive in the ontic counterparts of general and systematic 
explanations[text]. . . . The problem of universals arises when we ask what, if 
anything, could be the ontological counterpart of a representation (mental or 
otherwise) which has generality and not mere scope. (Sheredos 2016, p. [19]) 
 
Because systematic and general explanationstext have different import than singular 
explanationstext, they cannot be credentialed by a token explanationontic in the same way.9  
Rather than adopting a metaphysically otiose position about the reality of universals to 
save the ontic view, the more reasonable move is to concede that such ontic constraints, 
which require mapping explanations[text] veridically to concrete mechanisms the world, 
don't always have priority over epistemic norms.   
                                                
9 Sheredos raises this same objection against Strevens' "First Fundamental Theorem of 
Explanation" in his version of the ontic view (Sheredos 2016, p. [28]). 
 10 
 So far we have seen that the ontic view's desire to focus on normative constraints 
on explanations has required a move away from the view of explanations as concrete 
mechanisms in the world, towards something like a representational view of explanation 
(recall that while representations can be good/bad, objects in the world "just are").  The 
new claim of the ontic view is that the most fundamental normative constraint (that 
trumps all other normative constraints "downstream") is that explanationstext must 
completely and accurately map to explanationontic--this is what distinguishes good 
explanationstext from bad explanationstext.  We then examined the argument that even this 
new version of the ontic view is not always tenable (e.g., when explanations involve a 
generality beyond singular cases).  The way this debate has unfolded suggests that, in the 
context of discussions about normative constraints on explanation in scientific practice, 
the proper conception of scientific explanation is a representational one, and that 
epistemic constraints sometimes trump an accurate mapping to ontic entities, 
mechanisms, processes, etc.  This does not mean that ontic constraints play no role in 
distinguishing adequate scientific explanations, but rather that we need to develop a more 
sophisticated account of what precisely the appropriate ontic constraints amount to in 
different contexts.   
 
 
IV. Fictions, Understanding, and the Eikonic Conception of Explanation 
 Elsewhere I have defended a version of the representational conception of 
scientific explanation that I call the eikonic conception, which is named from the Greek 
word 'eikon' meaning representation or image (Bokulich in progress).  According to the 
eikonic conception, not only are the explanantia representations of the relevant processes 
(entities, structures, etc.), but so too are the explananda representations of the phenomena 
to be explained.  More specifically, they are representations of the phenomena 
contextualized within a particular research program and explanatory project.  The same 
phenomenon in the world (whether it is functioning as an explanans or explanandum) can 
be represented scientifically in more than one way, and some representations lend 
themselves more easily to certain lines of scientific inquiry than others.  In some cases 
this can simply involve representing the phenomenon at one of many different possible 
levels of abstraction or generality.  In other cases, it can involve representing the 
phenomenon in ways that we know it is not.    
 When trying to understand the nature of scientific explanation, it is helpful to take 
a step back and remember why it is we seek explanations: the goal of explanation is, 
arguably, understanding. My aim here is not to defend a particular theory of 
understanding, nor to elaborate the intricacies of the relationship between explanation and 
understanding, but rather to argue that explanations involving fictional representations 
can genuinely advance our scientific understanding and lead to true insights. 
 When one looks at the history of science and contemporary scientific practice, 
one can find many examples of when scientists purposely represent the phenomenon they 
are trying to explain in ways that they very well know are wrong.  A famous example is 
James Clerk Maxwell's vortex-idle-wheel model of the ether.10  After introducing this 
                                                
10 For philosophical discussions of this case see Nersessian (2002), Morrison (2014), and 
Bokulich (2015). 
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fictional vortex model, Maxwell concludes, “we have now shown in what way electro-
magnetic phenomena may be imitated by an imaginary system of molecular vortices" 
(Maxwell [1861/62] 1890, p. 488; emphasis added).  Maxwell is quite explicit that this is 
a fictional representation; nonetheless it is by reasoning with this fiction that he comes to 
the most important discovery of his career: that electromagnetic waves travel at the same 
speed as light, a coincidence that could only be justified by their identity.  In other words, 
the fiction of vortices functioned as a vehicle for the truth that light is electromagnetic 
radiation.   
 More generally, the fictional mechanism is a representation or model of the true 
mechanism, and if it is a good one—one that captures the relevant structural features or 
patterns of counterfactual dependence—then it can (when used with due diligence) stand 
in for the true mechanism in the scientist's reasoning and explanations, even though the 
ontology of the fictional mechanism is wrong.  Such cases are not limited to the history 
of science, and a contemporary example that I have discussed elsewhere in depth is 
semiclassical explanations of quantum phenomena, such as wavefunction scarring (see 
Bokulich 2008 or Bokulich 2009 for more details).  These latter sorts of cases are 
particularly interesting because they are ones in which we have the fundamental theory 
and true ontology in hand, and yet still resort to the fiction for the purpose of gaining 
better physical insight.   
 There is often an implicit assumption that when scientists use fictional 
representations, they must be misguided or confused.  As Catherine Elgin notes, however, 
"[t]hat misunderstanding involves representing things as they are not does not entail that 
whenever we represent things as they are not, we misunderstand them" (Elgin 2004, p. 
120).  Why would a scientist choose to make use of a fictional representation, especially 
if a veridical representation is at hand?  There are, of course, all sorts of possible answers, 
but the relevant one here is that there are some cases in which the fictional representation 
better facilitates the sort of physical insight that is needed for a particular explanatory 
project.  As Elgin further argues, fictions can "highlight certain aspects of the 
phenomena, reveal connections, patterns and discrepancies, and make possible insights 
that we could not otherwise obtain" (Elgin 2004, p. 127; see also Elgin 2007, p. 39).  
Obviously not just any fiction will do, and elsewhere I have suggested an approach for 
how one might go about distinguishing explanatory from non-explanatory fictions 
(Bokulich 2012).   
 Even if one has rejected the ontic conception of explanation in favor of a 
representational view, there is still a common presumption that a veridical representation 
is required for a successful explanation to be given and for genuine understanding to be 
gained.  Strevens, for example, has recently argued that one has scientific understanding 
of a phenomenon just in case one grasps a correct scientific explanation of that 
phenomenon, and, moreover, an explanation can be correct only if its constituent 
propositions are true (Strevens 2013, p. 512).  Although such a view might seem prima 
facie plausible, it is once again in tension with scientific practice.  Maxwell clearly 
gained genuine scientific understanding of electromagnetic phenomena and the nature of 
light, even though he did not have a correct causal-mechanical explanation whose 
constituent propositions were true.   
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 An alternative view of scientific understanding has been cogently defended by 
Elgin (2007) and Collin Rice (2016).11  Both Elgin and Rice argue that models can 
provide genuine scientific understanding of a phenomenon without providing an accurate 
representation of the relevant features of that phenomenon.  Elgin, for example, writes 
that the requirement that  
the propositions that express an understanding are true. . . . is unduly restrictive.  
It neither reflects our practices in ascribing understanding nor does justice to 
contemporary science. . . . I devise a more generous, flexible conception of 
understanding that accommodates science . . . and shows a sufficient but not 
slavish sensitivity to the facts. (Elgin 2007, p. 22) 
 
Rice defends a moderate version of this view, according to which "most" of what one 
believes about a phenomenon must be true in order for there to be genuine understanding, 
but this understanding doesn't require accurate representation.  Similar approaches have 
been developed by Mauricio Suárez (2004) in his “inferential approach to scientific 
representation,” Juha Saatsi (2011) in his "inferentially veridical representations," and 
more recently Jaakko Kuorikoski and Petri Ylikoski’s (2015) in their “inferentialist 
account of model-based understanding.”  The key move here is the recognition that 
scientific understanding requires having true modal information and the ability to draw 
correct inferences, but that one can achieve this "factive understanding" without having a 
true or accurate representation.  Certainly having an accurate representation is one way to 
get such modal information, but the success of idealized and fictional models in science 
teaches us that it is not the only way.  
 Obviously not all fictional representations will succeed in providing the scientist 
with such a factive understanding.  A representational conception of explanation, in 
making room for a broader range of normative constraints on explanation, still needs to 
satisfy ontic constraints of some sort, otherwise it risks not informing us about the world 
at all.  The key question, however, is precisely what form those ontic constraints should 
take.  Here we consider three different candidates for what the ontic constraints on 
explanation should be: 1. only the entities and processes in the world themselves can 
explain; 2. only veridical representations of those entities and processes can explain; 3. 
only representations (veridical, idealized, or fictional) that provide factive understanding 
can explain.  According to the original ontic conception of explanation, only the entities 
and processes in the world themselves can explain.  This approach was shown to be 
highly problematic, if not incoherent.  After the normative turn, the revised ontic 
approach, argued that only veridical representations can be explanatory.  We might call 
this the "standard view" of the ontic constraint on explanation.  As a blanket requirement, 
this construal of the ontic constraint was shown to be too restrictive, failing to recognize 
the ways in which fictional models (such as Maxwell's or the semiclassical theorist's) can 
succeed in giving us genuine physical insight and understanding in our explanations of 
certain phenomena.   
 There is a context in which I think something like the standard view is reasonable, 
and that is when one's explanation is specifically a project in ontology.  If one's 
                                                
11 Although Elgin and Rice differ on their construal of 'factive understanding', I believe 
they are at bottom arguing for a similar point.   
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explanatory project is to discover what the "furniture" of some domain of the world is, 
then a veridical representation of that ontology (at least to some degree) seems a 
reasonable requirement for success.12  Not all explanations are projects in ontology, 
however.  In many cases, scientists know what the fundamental ontology of a domain is, 
but the relevant question concerns how those elements interact in complicated ways to 
produce the phenomenon of interest.  In these latter sorts of cases, fictional 
representations can be especially perspicuous in highlighting the relevant features and 
patterns of dependence in the complex behavior that one is interested in.  The relevant 
ontic constraint, then, is that the fictional representation facilitate correct inferences and 
factive understanding of the phenomenon.13  This is precisely the sort of case we find in 
the semiclassical explanations of phenomena such as wavefunction scarring.  The 
physicists were not engaged in trying to discover what the fundamental ontology or laws 
of quantum mechanics were; this was already taken for granted.  The question instead 
was to try to gain physical insight into higher-level patterns of dependence in an 
enigmatic behavior.  In the following section I will briefly illustrate these sort of cases 
(explanatory fictions that meet the ontic constraint of producing factive understanding) 
with the more familiar example of explaining the motions of the tides.   
 
 
V. The Case of Gravity and the Tides  
 Consider the standard scientific explanation of the tides, as, for example, found on 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) website: 
[T]he moon and earth revolve together around their common centers of mass, or 
gravity [CoG].  The two astronomical bodies are held together by gravitational 
attraction, but are simultaneously kept apart by an equal [only at the CoG] and 
opposite centrifugal force produced by their individual revolutions around the 
center-of-mass of the earth-moon system. . . . At the earth's surface, an imbalance 
between these two forces results[,] . . . in the hemisphere of the earth turned 
toward the moon, [in] a net (or differential) tide-producing force which acts in the 
direction of the moon's gravitational attraction. . . . On the side of the earth 
directly opposite the moon, the net tide-producing force is in the direction of the 
greater centrifugal force, or away from the moon.  
(https://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/restles2.html) 
  
This results in two tidal bulges of ocean water on opposite sides of the earth (the high 
tides).  Thus, if you live somewhere like Boston Massachusetts, you will notice that there 
are two high tides and two low tides every day, as the earth rotates through these two 
bulges, roughly 12 hours apart (strictly speaking every half a lunar day, which is the time 
                                                
12 Even when it comes to projects in ontology, I suspect there can be some contexts in 
which there are multiple scientifically legitimate taxonomies that satisfy the 
accommodation demands of different domains of scientific inquiry, and so a more subtle 
story may need to be told about ontic constraints even the context of projects in ontology.   
13 This is intended as a minimal construal of the ontic constraint, not a full account of all 
the conditions that must be met by a good scientific explanation. 
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it takes the moon to again appear directly overhead, which is every 24 hours, 50 minutes, 
and 28 seconds).   
 The sun exerts a similar differential force (in the revolution around the common 
earth-sun system center of gravity); however, despite the sun's massiveness, its distance 
from the earth means that it exerts only half the force of the moon (the tide-generating 
force is inversely proportional to the cube of the distance).  When the sun and moon are 
aligned for a new moon or full moon, the lunar tidal bulge and the solar tidal bulge 
reinforce each other (constructive interference), producing larger "spring tides", and 
when the lunar bulge is orthogonal to the solar tidal bulge (at first-quarter and third-
quarter moons) then there is a destructive interference between the two tides and the tides 
are much lower ("neap tides").   
 Not every coast experiences two high tides and two low tides every day 
(semidiurnal tides) as one would expect.  Some places, like the Gulf of Mexico and the 
coast of Southeast Asia, experience only one high tide and one low tide a day (diurnal 
tides), while other locations experience a complicated mix of these two tidal patterns, 
such as the west coast of the US.  To explain why the tides arrive at a location when they 
do, one needs to add additional factors.  One complicating factor is that the tidal bulges 
can't move at the speed of the rotation of the earth, but rather move at a speed 
proportional to the depth of the ocean, as a forced wave, and this results in the tidal bulge 
being broken up into a series of distinct cells centered on an amphidromic point.  The 
presence of large bodies of land also affects the tides, by further interrupting the 
movement of the bulges and setting up a standing wave within the basin.  The shape of 
the coast and off-shore depth of the water both have a large impact on the behavior of 
tides as well.  As one textbook recounts, "A detailed analysis of all the variables that 
affect the tides at any particular coast reveals that nearly 400 factors are involved" 
(Trujillo and Thurman 2007, p. 288).  
 The received scientific explanation of the tides makes use of what we may call the 
gravitational force picture.  According to our best current scientific theory of gravity, 
general relativity, however, there is no such thing as a gravitational force.  Instead, 
general relativity teaches us that there is just curved spacetime.  There is no force pulling 
on the earth's oceans, the oceans are just "trying to go straight in a crooked world."14  In 
short, the gravitational force is a fiction.  It is, moreover, not just a fiction used in the 
pedagogical context of textbooks, but a fiction used by scientists in their scholarly 
publications in top scientific journals such as Physical Oceanography.  The gravitational 
force picture is, for example, used in Gouillon et al.'s (2010) explanation of the forced 
tidal response in the Gulf of Mexico, and in Skiba et al.'s (2013) study of the coupling 
between open-ocean and coastal diurnal tides as part of an explanation of why the "tides 
of the ice age, during which lower sea levels implied a much reduced area of continental 
shelves, were much larger than those of today" (Skiba et al. 2013, p. 1301), just to cite 
two arbitrary examples.  Indeed a search of the Journal of Physical Oceanography 
reveals that there is not a single article on the tides that even once mentions general 
relativity, stress-energy tensors, or spacetime manifolds.  I further suspect that there aren't 
any graduate programs in physical oceanography that require a course in general 
relativity.  Are we to conclude from this that physical oceanographers' failure to provide a 
                                                
14 I owe this wonderful expression to my colleague, John Stachel.   
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veridical representation of gravity (in accordance with the revised ontic conception) 
means that they are not in fact offering genuine scientific explanations of the tides?  Can 
only a spacetime physicist, who has a veridical representation of gravity to deploy, offer a 
genuine scientific explanation of the tides?  Is there no explanation of the tides until we 
have a quantum theory of gravity? 
 The explanation of the tides is the province of physical oceanography, and, in that 
context, the appropriate scientific representation of gravity is the force picture.  Physical 
oceanographers are not engaged in the ontological project of finding out what gravity is; 
rather, they are interested in how gravity interacts with other factors to produce the 
complex tidal phenomena that they are trying to explain and understand.  In the context 
of this scientific project, the classical Newtonian force picture does a better job of making 
transparent the relevant patterns of counterfactual dependence, and moreover, more easily 
lends itself to the incorporation of the other relevant causal factors in the production of 
the tides, which are also represented in a Newtonian picture.15   
 The physical oceanographer's use of the fictional force representation of gravity is 
in no way inferior to an explanation of the tides that makes use of a veridical 
representation of gravity as the curved geodesic structure of a 4-D spacetime manifold 
whose metric is determined, in accordance with the Einstein field equations, by the 
stress-energy tensor of the matter fields.  The heavy machinery of this veridical 
representation adds no scientific value to the physical oceanographer's explanation of the 
tides.16  Indeed I submit that, if used, it would result in an inferior explanation for the 
reasons given above.   
 The physical oceanographers who use the gravitational force picture are not 
confused about the nature of gravity; they know very well that the gravitational force is a 
fiction, and even more importantly, they know that it is not (what I have elsewhere, 
following Niels Bohr, called) a "mere" fiction (Bokulich 2009).  It is rather what I want 
to call a credentialed fiction: it is a fiction that the scientific community has examined in 
relation to a veridical representation and determined that, for certain contexts, it is an 
adequate representation that can succeed in giving genuine physical insight into, and 
factive understanding of, a phenomenon of interest; and if it is used properly, it will not 
lead scientists astray in their inferential reasoning.17 
 
 
                                                
15 Juha Saatsi (forthcoming) has used the example of Newtonian gravitational force to 
argue that explanatory indispensability does not license a realist conclusion in the context 
of mathematics, and like here, argues that gravitational forces qualify as explanatory by 
correctly latching onto modal dependence relations. 
16 I am not saying that general relativity adds no scientific value in general--it is of course 
a tremendously important scientific discovery and is absolutely the appropriate 
representation in many scientific contexts; but explaining the ocean's tides is not one of 
those contexts.   
17 This credentialing process is related to what I have called the "justificatory step" in 
explanatory models (e.g., Bokulich 2011). 
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VI. Conclusion 
 By way of conclusion, let me briefly rehearse some possible objections to the 
view presented here and my responses.  One objection was the worry that scientists will 
be misled into confusion and a false sense of understanding if they make use of fictions.  
As we saw with Vaihinger, part of what makes a fiction scientific is the express 
awareness that it is strictly speaking false.18  Moreover I argued that the fictions scientists 
typically deploy are not "mere" fictions, but rather are credentialed fictions.  This 
credentialing process can take place in a number of different ways.  In the case of the 
tides, scientists have shown that the Newtonian gravitational force picture is an adequate 
approximation of the general relativistic account in the limit of slow-moving particles in 
a weak gravitational field (i.e., in the regime in which ocean tidal phenomena occur).  In 
the case of Maxwell, the credentialing process seemed to involve a physical analogy 
between the fictional representation and the phenomenon of interest, in which both 
systems were describable by mathematical equations that take the same form (Bokulich 
2015).  In yet other cases, the credentialing process might involve showing that the 
fictional system and the real system of interest fall into the same universality class (e.g., 
Batterman and Rice 2014).  In calling credentialing a process, I mean to signal that it 
takes place over an extended period of time, and, hence, some fictions may be farther 
along in the credentialing process than others.  The credentialing process is by no means 
infallible, but it is no more or less fallible than the rest of scientific knowledge.   
 A second objection might be, why bother using a fictional representation if we 
have a veridical representation at hand?  Isn't it always better to use the truest, most 
complete representation that we've got?  I argued that sometimes a fictional 
representation does a better job of highlighting the relevant patterns of dependence than a 
veridical one.  To very loosely paraphrase Jessamyn West, the fiction of Newtonian 
forces reveals truths that the reality of the 4-D pseudo-Riemannian spacetime metric 
obscures.  Which representation of a phenomenon is best is, for example, a function of 
the relevant scale (e.g., spatial, temporal, or energy scale) of the phenomenon one is 
interested in, as well as the particular scientific context of the explanatory project.   
 A third objection might argue that any purported explanation that makes use of 
the Newtonian force picture can only, at best, tell us what the explanation of the tides 
would be, were Newtonian mechanics the true theory of the world.  Strevens seems to 
defend such a view.  In the same article in which he argues that an individual has 
scientific understanding of a phenomenon just in case one grasps a correct scientific 
explanation (and that an explanation is 'correct' only if its constitutive propositions are 
true), Strevens goes on to distinguish a secondary notion of understanding that he calls 
"understanding with."  He writes, 
To have "understanding with" of Newtonian physics is to be able to construct or 
grasp an array of Newtonian explanations that are good in the sense that they are 
internally correct--they would be correct if only Newtonian physics were true. 
(Strevens 2013, p. 513) 
 
                                                
18 Vaihinger also required that a scientific fiction be expedient, in the sense of serving the 
aims of science.   
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I think this is an overly pessimistic view of the understanding that Newtonian physics 
provides.  Newtonian physics continues to be a required part of our science curriculum 
because it provides us with an understanding of our actual world, not just some 
hypothetical one.  The physical oceanographers who offer Newtonian explanations of the 
tides are gaining an understanding of the real oceans, not just the oceans of some 
imaginary world.   
 At the other extreme, one might argue that if they are doing real explanatory work 
and providing genuine understanding, then they must not be fictions after all.  Jessica 
Wilson has defended such a view.  She writes, "I defend Newtonian forces against the 
four best reasons for denying or doubting their existence" (Wilson 2007, p. 173).  She 
explicitly denies that they should be thought of as fictions, and instead argues that they 
should be admitted as part of the (nonfundamental) ontology of the world.  Robert 
Batterman has been accused of similarly reifying entities that our best current scientific 
theories say are fictions.  In his discussion of Batterman's book, Michael Redhead writes, 
Now, says Batterman, the explanation of universality in catastrophe optics 
involves the notion of a caustic and this notion belongs to ray optics and has no 
smooth correspondence or reduction to any notion in wave optics. . . . What 
Batterman is effectively doing is to reify this auxiliary mathematics so that the ray 
structure become part of the physical ontology. (Redhead 2004, pp. 529-530) 
 
The wave theory replaced the ray theory as our fundamental theory of light.  The 
assumption here again is that, if the fictional representation of caustics (the envelope of 
light rays reflected by a curved surface) is doing work in a scientific explanation, we 
must be mistaken that it is a fiction and instead give it a realist interpretation.  The view 
taken here is that the explanatory power of a posit does not automatically license a realist 
conclusion.  I would argue that light rays are an explanatory fiction, one that has been 
credentialed by our best current science, and hence is a (fictional) representation of light 
that, when used appropriately, will give genuine insight into optical phenomena and not 
lead scientists astray.   
 A final objection might insist that it is the object in the world that is the real 
explanation, not any of our representations of it.  This is just a bald reassertion of the 
original ontic conception.  On the view defended here, objects in the world push, pull, 
dissolve, or otherwise cause things to happen, while it is people who explain.  Redefining 
'explain' to mean 'cause' (or its cousins) just unhelpfully muddies the waters.  As we saw, 
however, it is difficult for either side to get traction in this semantic debate, and a more 
productive discussion involves the nature of the ontic constraints on explanation after the 
normative turn.  On the revised ontic conception, now advocated by Craver (2014), the 
task of a philosophical theory scientific explanation is explanatory demarcation (showing 
how explanation relates to other scientific achievements) and explanatory normativity 
(what distinguishes good explanations from bad ones).  A pre-requisite for such a project 
is the recognition that explanations are fundamentally some sort of representation, and 
the moniker 'ontic' now refers to a commitment to the primacy of veridical 
representations of what used to be called explanationsontic.   
 Pace the revised ontic conception, I argued that for many explanatory projects in 
science, a veridical representation of the causes is not what is most important.  Instead, 
the relevant consideration is whether the representation licenses correct inferences and 
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provides scientists with true modal information.  This is precisely what we see in the 
physical oceanographers' explanations of the tides.  Physical oceanographers are not 
interested in a veridical representation of the ontology of gravity; this is already known 
and is not a representation that is useful for bringing out the relevant patterns of 
counterfactual dependence in the phenomenon they are trying to explain.  When it comes 
to the ocean's tides, the credentialed fiction of Newtonian forces does a much better job.  
As Abbott would say, "the work is skillfully done; the object of making fiction the 
vehicle of truth, is successfully and safely accomplished." 
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